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Abstract 
The paper investigates the effects of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics, 
and the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the debt maturity structure of firms in the Asia Pacific 
region. The results indicate that firms in this region have a target optimal debt maturity 
structure, and the maturity structure decision of a firm is driven by both its own characteristics 
and the economic environment.  They also reveal that the crisis had significant effect on firm’s 
debt maturity structure and their determinants.  
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1. Introduction 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller suggests that debt maturity choice is irrelevant 
in efficient capital markets. However, short-term debt can reduce shareholder’s risk if there is 
uncertainty of future interest rates, since investors cannot easily diversify away inter-temporal 
risk (Morris, 1976). Consequently, debt maturity can affect firm’s value. Subsequent theoretical 
literature on the role of debt maturity structure on firm value offers arguments in support of 
several hypotheses, from tax (Brick and Ravid, 1985) and liquidity risk hypotheses (Diamond, 
1991), to moral hazard (Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1980) and signalling hypotheses (Flannery, 
1986; Diamond, 1991). A host of empirical studies, focusing mainly on firms operating in major 
developed markets, have assessed the validity of these hypotheses (Barclay and Smith, 1995).1 
On the strength of both theoretical and empirical results, it is now established that the choice of 
corporate debt maturity is one of the most important financing decisions, since an inappropriate 
choice can increase agency costs and lead to inefficient liquidation.  
Despite this wealth of literature, the theoretical predictions and the supporting empirical 
evidence on the debt maturity decision of firms are mixed. More importantly, little is known 
about whether, to what extent and how the observed differences in corporate governance and 
institutional environment may affect the debt maturity choice of firms2, and most studies analyse 
the experience of firms under ‘normal’ market conditions. This paper aims to further address the 
debt maturity decision and contribute to two new and important dimensions of the literature. 
Firstly, it investigates the potential effects of economic conditions, corporate governance and 
institutional set-up on the debt maturity structure of firms in both emerging and more developed 
economies in the Pacific Basin region. Secondly, it provides the first evidence on the effects of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the determinants of corporate debt maturity choice of firms 
operating in the region. An improved understanding of these issues should help both financial 
                                                 
1
 An exception to this is Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), who analyse the choice of debt maturity structure 
in 30 countries, and show that there are many similarities in the determinants of firms’ debt maturity choice across 
developed and developing markets. 
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markets and companies to identify the sources of financial risk and how to manage it in 
different, and changing, economic and institutional conditions. 
The selection of the four sample countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Australia, is based on three important considerations. First, the 1997 Asian crisis affected the 
chosen countries by different degrees. Thus, an investigation of the effects of the crisis on the 
corporate debt maturity structure of these nations can shed light on how changes in 
macroeconomic conditions may affect firm level decisions. Second, firms in these countries 
operate under different legal, corporate governance and economic settings, and thus the effects 
of these different environments can be directly addressed. Third, this study extends the current 
international evidence on corporate financial decisions in general and the sparse literature on the 
experience of firms from this region in particular.3 To achieve these objectives the paper 
investigates: (i) firm-specific and country-specific determinants of corporate debt maturity 
structure in the Asia Pacific region; (ii) whether, and how, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 
affected the corporate debt maturity choice of firms; and (iii) whether the determinants of 
corporate debt maturity structure are different across countries at different stages of economic 
and financial development.  
 
2. Economic and Institutional Environment 
Economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional environments may influence 
the relationship between managers, shareholders and creditors, as well as investors’ behaviour. 
This may offer some explanations for the different patterns of financing behaviour observed 
across countries and regions. The indicators of economic and legal environment summarised in 
Table 1 show that there are variations across the sample countries, and that the ownership 
                                                                                                                                                            
2
 Exceptions include Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Fan et al. (2004) and Antoniou et al. (2006). 
3
 See Deesomsak et al. (2004) for a discussion of the different economic and legal environments in the sample 
countries and for references to other empirical investigations in this region.   
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structure of firms in this region tends to be highly concentrated leading to higher agency costs of 
debt. It is expected that this disparity in corporate governance and institutional environment 
affects the relevance of the different potential determinants of debt maturity structure, and 
contributes to explaining variations across sample countries.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Firm’s financing decisions may also be affected by unforeseeable economic events, such 
as the Asian financial crisis of July 1997. The effects of this crisis on individual countries varied 
considerably and showed the vulnerability of the less developed economies in the region. The 
crisis originated in Thailand and Malaysia and quickly spread throughout the region. Singapore 
successfully averted the worst effects of the crisis and recovered quickly, while evidence 
suggests that Australia was not really affected. This is not surprising, because Australia had 
deeper and more mature financial markets as a consequence of the financial deregulation of the 
1980s, and was not subject to the fatal combination of large volatile capital flows and a fragile 
domestic financial sector that characterised many East Asian countries. 
It has been suggested that, in the period preceding the Asian crisis, asymmetric 
information problems worsened, and the deterioration of balance sheets eventually led to the 
crisis. Financial markets were no longer able to allocate funds efficiently.  Firms became more 
concerned about their debt exposure and creditors more stringent in their lending. The 1997 
Asian crisis emphasised the importance of a carefully chosen maturity-mix of debt to both firms 
and their lenders. It also highlighted the inefficiency of the corporate governance, legal and 
institutional environment in this region, and the consequences of unsound lending decisions and 
lack of transparency. It is therefore reasonable to expect that this economy-wide event may have 
had a significant impact on the debt maturity decision of firms. 
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3. Corporate Debt Maturity and Hypotheses Development 
The main hypotheses identified by the literature on debt maturity structure relate to moral 
hazard, taxation, signalling, and liquidity risk.4 The moral hazard hypothesis emphasizes the 
role of short-term debt in reducing agency problems, such as under-investment and asset 
substitution. Myers (1977) and Barnea et al. (1980) suggest that firms can control the under-
investment problem by shortening the effective maturity of their debt, since when short-term 
debt matures before growth options are exercised there is an opportunity for firms to re-contract 
and for debt to be re-priced, so that gains from new investment do not accrue to debtholders. In 
addition, Barnea et al. (1980) propose that short-term debt can mitigate the adverse risk 
incentives of debt financing, or the asset substitution problem, because short-term debt is less 
sensitive to risk shifting. Thus, short-term debt reduces shareholders’ incentives to engage in 
high-risk projects. In relation to the tax hypothesis, Brick and Ravid (1985) propose an 
irrelevance theorem and identify the specific conditions under which taxation can affect debt 
maturity. Kane et al. (1985) establish that the net benefit of tax, after allowing for the cost of 
bankruptcy, tends to be very small and thus not sufficient to offset the amortized transaction or 
floatation costs. In this context, firms should lengthen debt maturity only if the tax advantage is 
higher than the amortized floatation costs. 
The signalling and the liquidity risk hypotheses were developed by Flannery (1986) and 
Diamond (1991). When there is asymmetric information between lenders and firms, and in 
particular managers have better or timelier information about firm’s value than investors, the 
nature of equilibrium is determined by transaction or floatation costs. The market cannot 
distinguish between good and bad quality firms and a separating equilibrium ensues. Higher 
quality firms prefer short-term debt to avoid paying a market premium on long-term debt that is 
too high for their quality, and lower quality firms prefer long-term debt, because the market 
premium on long-term debt reflects a probability of default that is lower than their own. If firms 
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consider liquidity risk, they will trade off the benefits of short-term debt against their liquidity 
risk.  
3.1. Firm-Specific Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
The paper applies a the balance-sheet approach5 and defines debt maturity (MAT) as the 
proportion of long-term debt to total debt, where long-term debt includes debt of more than one-
year maturity. The firm-specific explanatory variables include leverage, firm size, growth 
opportunities, earnings volatility, liquidity, profitability, share price performance, and asset 
maturity. Table 2, Panel A, summarizes the relationship postulated by different theories between 
firm-specific variables and debt maturity, and specifies the proxy measures used. The liquidity 
risk hypothesis predicts that a firm lengthens its debt maturity as leverage (LEV) increases in 
order to offset the higher probability of a liquidity crisis, and thus delay exposure to bankruptcy 
risk. Therefore, leverage is expected to be positively correlated with debt maturity. On the 
contrary however, Myers (1977) suggests that the agency cost of under-investment can be 
mitigated by either reducing leverage or shortening debt maturity. If the former is used, there is 
less need for the latter. Thus, the moral hazard hypothesis predicts a negative relationship 
between leverage and debt maturity. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 The moral hazard and the signalling hypotheses predict a positive relationship between 
firm size (SIZE) and debt maturity. In the presence of moral hazard, smaller firms are more 
likely to experience conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, leading to problems such as 
risk shifting, asset substitution and claim dilution. The signalling role of debt is also more 
important in smaller firms as they might communicate less information to outsiders leading to 
more informational asymmetries because of economies of scale in information production and 
distribution. This prediction is further strengthened by a number of other factors. First, managers 
                                                                                                                                                            
4
 See Ravid (1996) for an extensive survey of the theoretical studies on corporate debt maturity structure. 
5
 Previous studies that applied this approach are Barclay et al. (2003) and Antoniou et al. (2006). 
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of small firms are more likely to hold a substantial amount of equity in the firms they manage, 
and thus will tend to be more risk seeking than managers of larger firms. Second, since small 
firms tend to have more growth options and thus higher agency costs than large firms, debt 
holders tend to reduce the risk of lending to smaller firms by restricting the length of debt 
maturity. Finally, large firms tend to issue more long-term debt because of easier access to 
capital markets, while smaller firms rely more heavily on bank debt. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is predicted between debt maturity and firm size. 
 Growth opportunity (GROW) is expected to be inversely related to long-term debt. The 
agency cost of debt is likely to be higher for high growth firms, as new investment can increase 
risk, and informational asymmetries also tend to increase with growth opportunities. Agency 
related under-investment problems can be mitigated by issuing short-term debt that expires 
before growth options are exercised. Issuing short-term debt also signals quality to the market 
and avoids the high information costs that come with long-term debt. However, the liquidity risk 
hypothesis predicts a positive relationship because firms can reduce the probability of inefficient 
liquidation of their risky growth opportunities by issuing long-term debt. Kane et al. (1985) 
argue that there is an inverse relationship between the optimal debt maturity and earnings 
volatility (VOL). Firms with low earnings volatility prefer longer debt maturity to avoid 
frequent re-balancing of their capital structure. On the contrary, firms with higher business risk 
are prone to higher agency costs, and thus they have an incentive to shorten debt maturity to 
lower agency costs. Therefore, a negative relationship between long-term debt and liquidity 
(LIQ) is expected.  
 Profitability (PROF) is likely to be positively related to debt maturity, because profitable 
firms have higher taxable income, and thus receive greater tax benefits from long-term debt. 
Taxability can influence firms’ debt maturity because choosing long-term debt over short-term 
debt can create a tax timing option to repurchase and re-issue debt. Antoniou et al. (2006) link 
the positive relationship between share price performance (SPP) and debt maturity structure to 
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the signalling power of debt. For instance, if managers perceive that a drop in share price fails to 
reflect the ‘true’ (but unknown) value of the firm, they have a motivation to send a credible 
signal to the market. This can be done by issuing short-term debt, as it confirms that managers 
are prepared to be closely monitored and frequently assessed by lenders. Similarly, firms with 
favourable information tend to avoid long-term debt and issue short-term debt instead, because 
they hope to negotiate more favourable terms later. The relationship between asset maturity 
(AMAT) and debt maturity is expected to be positive, as firms tend to match the maturity 
structure of assets and liabilities to reduce the agency costs of debt. 
Finally, several studies (Ozkan, 2000; Antoniou et al., 2006) show that firms tend to set a 
target debt maturity ratio. If any deviation from the target occurs, the speed at which firms 
adjust their debt maturity structure towards the target depends on the costs of adjustment versus 
the costs of remaining off the target. We test for the presence of a target ratio by incorporating 
the one-period lagged debt maturity in a partial adjustment model. 
3.2.  Country-Specific Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure 
Recent studies show that corporate financing decisions are determined not only by firm-
specific characteristics, but also by country-specific factors such as economic conditions, 
corporate governance and institutional environment (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999); 
Fan et al., 2004; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Antoniou et al., 2006). Different market conditions can 
influence firm’s borrowing decisions by affecting the level of long- and short-term debt and by 
creating incentives for firms to alter the debt maturity mix. We categorise the country-specific 
explanatory variables into two groups: (i) market-wide determinants, which include economic 
development, bank development, stock market development, term structure of interest rates, and 
inflation; and (ii) legal and corporate governance determinants, which include quality of legal 
enforcement, legal protection, ownership concentration, and information intermediary activity. 
Table 2, Panels B and C, summarizes the relationship postulated by different theories between 
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the variables in these two groups of country-specific determinants and debt maturity, and 
specifies the proxy measures used. 
With respect to market-wide determinants, Fan et al. (2004) suggest that firms in 
developing countries tend to use far less long-term debt than firms in developed countries. To 
test for this, a developing economy dummy variable (EDEV) is used. Bank development 
(BKDEV) is expected to be inversely related to debt maturity, because short-term debt enables 
banks to use their comparative advantage in monitoring lenders. Stock market development 
(MKDEV) is expected to be positively related to debt maturity since market prices transmit 
information making lending to quoted firms less risky. However, there is also an incentive for 
firms in countries with developed stock markets to switch from long-term debt to equity, as the 
additional liquidity of the stock market encourages risk taking behaviour from well-informed 
investors. This could lead stock market development to be negatively related to debt maturity 
because firms may want to use more short-term debt to reduce agency costs.   
 The tax hypothesis predicts that firms should employ more long-term debt when the term 
structure of interest rates (TERM) slopes upward. Brick and Ravid (1985) show that different 
time patterns of interest payments can affect the choice of debt maturity of firms. They suggest 
that firms lengthen their debt maturity when the term structure is upward sloping, because the 
tax-shield value of long-term debt is higher and because the interest tax shield of debt is 
accelerated by increasing the proportion of debt payments. Thus, issuing long-term debt can 
increase firm’s value. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the yield curve influences the 
maturity of new debt. In this respect, market timing predicts that at times of high interest rates 
firms prefer to issue short-term debt while they are waiting for long-term interest rates to decline 
in future. Finally, there is some evidence that an increase in inflation (INF) tends to reduce the 
use of long-term debt by both large and small firms (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999), 
since debt contracts are generally based on nominal terms and thus high inflation may increase 
the interest rate risk faced by firms. 
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The quality of legal enforcement is measured by the level of corruption (CORR), which is 
expected to be negatively related to corporate debt maturity. When the legal system has less 
integrity, or is inefficient, debt is used more than equity financing, and short-term debt more 
than long-term debt, since a shorter maturity limits the firm’s opportunity to expropriate 
creditors.  Creditor rights (CRR) and shareholder rights (SHR) indexes are used to measure 
legal protection. Diamond (1991) argues that lenders who engage in monitoring have incentives 
to lend short-term. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) also suggest that strong creditor 
rights increase the incentive of banks to monitor firms. Shareholders’ protection, on the 
contrary, decreases the agency cost of debt. Consequently, in countries with strong shareholder 
rights, firms should need less short-term debt to mitigate agency problems. Therefore, debt 
maturity is expected to be negatively (positively) related to creditor rights (shareholder rights). 
When ownership concentration (OWN) is high, the interests of shareholders and managers 
align, leading to higher agency costs of debt. Therefore, the moral hazard hypothesis predicts 
that firms in countries with high ownership concentration should issue more short-term debt in 
order to mitigate agency problems. This suggests a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and debt maturity. Finally, since auditors enhance the credibility of public 
information by certifying the firm’s accounts their presence should diminish the role of short-
term debt in mitigating information problems and lead to a positive relationship between 
information intermediary activity (AUD) and debt maturity. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
The sample comprises of a panel of all firms in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Australia, listed in the national stock exchanges over the period 1993-2001. Financial firms and 
firms with missing observations are excluded. Firm’s financial data are obtained from 
Datastream. The final sample consists of 1,726 observations for Thai firms, 2,493 for Malaysian 
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firms, 1,164 for Singaporean firms, and 809 for Australian firms. Because of the requirement of 
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) methodology that firms with less than three 
consecutive observations are also excluded, fewer observations are used when using GMM. 
Table 3 presents the averages of the variables used in measuring debt maturity, firm-
specific and market-wide determinants. Countries are combined by how severely they were hit 
by the crisis, with Australia and Singapore being the least affected and more developed 
economies, and Malaysia and Thailand the most affected and emerging economies. Table 3 
presents initial evidence of significant differences in debt maturity pattern and determinants 
between the two country groupings. Firms in developed economies have more long-term debts 
than firms in emerging economies. The financial crisis had several significant effects on most 
factors, more so in the countries most affected by the crisis. Overall, the crisis led firms in this 
region to issue higher debt on average, as equity issues became problematic in unstable markets. 
Growth opportunity and share price performance decreased significantly after the crisis, while 
asset maturity increased. Profitability changed significantly after the crisis in the countries most 
affected. Market-wide factors also changed considerably.  For both country groupings, bank’s 
assets became larger relative to GDP. Stock markets were most severely hit in the countries 
most affected. Short-term interest rates increased (decreased) relative to long-term rates for the 
countries most (least) affected by the crisis. For both country groupings, inflation decreased 
after the crisis, and volatility of earnings and liquidity of firms were affected significantly by the 
crisis. These initial observations further motivate an analysis of the changes in the determinants 
of debt maturity structure after the Asian crisis.  
 [Insert Table 3] 
 4.2. Methodology 
To test for the existence of a target optimal debt maturity structure, lagged debt maturity is 
included in a partial adjustment model as in Ozkan (2000) and Antoniou et al. (2006). If a firm 
has a target debt maturity ratio, the coefficient of the one-period lagged debt maturity is between 
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0 and 1. If the cost of diverging from the target is higher than the cost of adjustment, then the 
speed of adjustment (measured by 1 minus the coefficient of the lagged debt maturity) is 
expected to be faster (higher).6 To examine the role of firm-specific determinants of debt 
maturity, the individual firm’s debt maturity structure is modelled as a function of k firm-
specific factors and its one-period lag for each country as follows:  
, 0 1 , 1 , , ,
1
(1)
N
i t i t k k i t i t i t
k
Y Y FFα β γ α α µ
−
=
= + + + + +∑  
where, Yi,t is firm i's debt maturity at time t; FFk,i,t is a vector of firm i’s k firm-specific factors; 
αi and αt represent time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects and time-specific effects 
which are common to all firms at any one time but vary through time; and the disturbance term 
µi,t is time-varying and serially uncorrelated with mean zero and variance σ2. 
As shown in Antoniou et al. (2006), GMM-SYS is the most appropriate method to 
estimate equation (1).7 Wherever appropriate, we use the more efficient two-step GMM 
estimator. The suitability of instruments is confirmed by the Sargan test. As shocks that affect 
debt maturity structure may also affect other firm-specific factors, all explanatory variables may 
not be strictly exogenous. Therefore, the dependent variable is treated as endogenous and the 
explanatory variables as weakly exogenous. 
To test for the importance of economic conditions on corporate debt maturity structure, the 
data for the four sample countries are subsequently pooled to create one panel. Due to the nature 
of the data, equation (2) below is estimated using OLS instead of GMM-SYS: 
, 0 , , , , ,
1 1
(2)
N N
i t k k i t m m j t t i t
k m
Y FF CDα γ ω α µ
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑  
where the notation is the same as in equation (1), and CDm,j,t refers to a vector of country j’s 
country dummy m, taking the value of 1 for Thailand (THDUM), Malaysia (MLDUM) and 
                                                 
6
 For a detailed discussion of the speed of adjustment model see Antoniou et al. (2006). 
7
 Four different methodologies, OLS in levels, OLS-first differences, GMM-differences and GMM-SYS, were used 
to estimate Eq. (1) and GMM-SYS was confirmed to be the most appropriate methodology.  
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Singapore (SPDUM), and 0 otherwise. Country dummies are subsequently replaced firstly by an 
economic development dummy (EDEV), which takes the value of 1 for Thailand and Malaysia 
and 0 for Singapore and Australia, and secondly by the legal and governance variables identified 
in Section 3.3 above, one at a time. 
Since the role of market-wide determinants may vary depending on how severely the crisis 
hit different countries, and thus estimating across all countries may be misleading as effects may 
cancel each other out, the data for the four sample countries are subsequently divided into two 
groups: countries least affected and countries most affected by the Asian crisis. Equation (1) is 
augmented with market-wide factors, one at a time, over the whole sample period, using GMM-
SYS as the main estimation method. Finally, to further investigate the possible effects of the 
1997 Asian crisis, equation (1) augmented by the market-wide determinants is re-estimated with 
GMM-SYS over two sub-sample periods, the pre-crisis period between 1993 and 1996, and the 
post-crisis period between 1998 and 2001. Wald-statistics are estimated to test for any 
significant change in the role of the identified variables due to the financial crisis. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Debt Maturity Dynamics: Firm-specific effects on debt maturity  
 Table 4 (Panel A) presents the findings from estimating equation (1) using GMM-SYS for 
whole sample period. AR (1) suggests a negative first-order serial correlation, while AR (2) 
suggests the absence of second-order serial correlation, satisfying the assumption of no higher-
order serial correlation. All Wald statistics of joint significance of the regressors (Wald Test 1) 
are significant. The Sargan test indicates that the instruments used are valid and not correlated 
with the error term. The coefficients of lagged debt maturity are positive. The findings are 
consistent with Ozkan (2000) and Antoniou et al. (2006) and suggest that firms in this region 
have a target optimal debt maturity structure. Australian firms have the highest adjustment speed 
(0.71), while Malaysian firms show a relatively slow adjustment (0.48).  
14 
 
 Table 4 (Panel B) presents the findings by country groupings. The estimates confirm that 
firms have target debt maturity structure during both pre- and post-crisis periods. In the pre-
crisis period, firms in the countries least affected by the crisis appeared to be able to adjust their 
debt maturity structure to the target level faster (1-β ~ 0.70) than firms in the countries most 
affected (1-β ~ 0.40). While the crisis did not have a significant impact on the speed of 
adjustment for firms in the countries most affected by the crisis, in the countries least affected 
the crisis substantially slowed down the speed of adjustment, suggesting that the adjustment 
process was relatively costly in the aftermath of the crisis. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The results for the whole sample period (Table 4, Panel A) show that leverage8 is 
positively related to debt maturity, supporting the liquidity risk argument that higher leverage 
encourages firms to avoid short-term debt. It also implies that leverage and debt maturity are 
used as strategic complements to reduce the under-investment problem, as suggested by Barclay 
et al. (2003). The coefficients of firm size are positive and significant confirming the hypothesis 
that small firms are prone to higher agency costs of debt and thus tend to shorten their debt 
maturity to reduce these costs. The findings also support the signalling hypothesis, which 
stipulates that small firms have higher levels of asymmetric information, and thus they are more 
motivated to use short-term debt to signal their quality to the market. However, growth 
opportunity has no influence on the debt maturity structure of firms.9 Debt maturity may not be 
used to reduce the under-investment problem, because firms, especially in Malaysia and 
Singapore, have highly concentrated ownership and a close relationship with their banks. 
                                                 
8
 To examine the sensitivity of the results to the definition of leverage, equation (1) was also estimated with 
leverage redefined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The (unreported) results were statistically similar to those 
discussed in the paper. In addition, Barclay et al. (2003) point out that the regression coefficients can be potentially 
biased and inconsistent when both leverage and investment opportunities are included in the regression as 
independent variables. Thus, alternative formulations were estimated excluding leverage from the model. The 
(unreported) estimates were similar to those presented in the paper, confirming that the results are robust. 
9
 Esho et al. (2002) obtain similar results for Australian firms. Deesomsak et al. (2004) also find that growth 
opportunity has no significant effect on the capital structure decision of Malaysian and Australian firms.  
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 Earnings volatility has a negative effect on debt maturity only in Singapore.  This is 
consistent with the findings of other studies (Guedes and Opler, 1996) and supports the 
bankruptcy cost argument. Liquidity is positively related to debt maturity in all countries. This 
suggests that firms in this region choose to issue more long-term debt when they are more liquid 
to avoid cash shortages and lower their probability of bankruptcy. Contrasting results between 
developed and emerging countries are found for the relationship between profitability and debt 
maturity. This relationship is positive and significant only for firms in emerging countries, 
supporting the tax hypothesis that highly profitable firms minimize their tax liability by 
choosing longer-term debt. Mixed results are also found for the relationship between share price 
performance and debt maturity. A positive and significant relationship is only observed in 
Australia, supporting the signalling hypothesis that firms whose shares are perceived to under-
perform tend to issue shorter-term debt to signal their quality to the market, while firms whose 
shares are perceived to over-perform issue longer-term debt to exploit the market mispricing. 
Mixed support is shown for the maturity-matching hypothesis, as asset maturity is positively 
related to debt maturity only in Singapore. 
The findings in Table 4 (Panel B) show three distinctive effects of the crisis on the role of 
firm-specific determinants. Firstly, the Asian crisis had different effects between country 
groupings on the relationship between debt maturity and leverage, earnings volatility, and 
profitability. The role of long-term debt in offsetting the higher liquidity risk and in delaying the 
exposure to bankruptcy, as proxied by leverage, reduced substantially after the crisis in the 
countries least affected. However, the opposite pattern is found for the countries most affected 
by the crisis, due to higher financial distress and expected bankruptcy costs following the crisis. 
Earnings volatility played no role in the most affected countries in either pre- or post-crisis 
periods, whereas it became a significant negative factor in the least affected countries after the 
crisis. This negative relationship implies a stronger agency effect in the more developed markets 
and is consistent with findings from developed markets (Guedes and Opler, 1996). The 
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relationship between profitability and debt maturity in the most affected countries became 
significantly positive in the post-crisis period, implying that the financial crisis might have 
raised firms’ awareness of tax effects, but no significant effect is found for the countries least 
affected by the crisis. Secondly, the crisis appears to have had similar effects on the relationship 
between debt maturity and liquidity in both country groupings, regardless of how severely they 
were hit by the crisis. Although before the crisis liquidity played no role, after the crisis it 
became a significant positive factor in determining debt maturity. This implies that after the 
crisis firms with higher levels of liquidity chose to issue longer-term debt to avoid cash 
shortages. Thirdly, the results also reveal that the financial crisis did not alter the effects of asset 
maturity, share price performance, firm size and growth opportunity.  
In summary, the findings presented in Table 4 show that some determinants were more 
powerful and consistent than others in explaining the choice of debt maturity of firms operating 
in the Asia Pacific region.10 The results not only show how the crisis affected the firm’s 
financing decision, but also show considerable variation in the importance of the determinants 
of debt maturity structure across sample countries, motivating further investigation into the 
effects of country-specific variables.  
5.2. Country-specific effects on debt maturity  
To investigate country-specific effects on debt maturity, equation (2) is estimated using 
panel data that combine all firms across all sample countries over the whole sample period.11 All 
country dummies coefficients are highly significant, showing that country-specific factors play a 
part in the debt maturity choice of firms. To investigate this general finding further, country 
dummies are replaced with an economic development dummy and several legal and corporate 
                                                 
10
 As a robustness test, debt maturity was also modelled as a function of k firm specific factors for each country 
using pooled OLS. Industry dummies are included in the model to control for industry effects, but they were found 
to be statistically insignificant. Further robustness tests are conducted by using cross-sectional OLS analysis to 
preserve the dispersion across firms and eliminate the serial correlation problem in residuals that tends to inflate the 
t-statistics in pooled regressions (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The results from pooled OLS and cross-sectional 
estimations are not qualitatively different from those presented in Table 4. 
11
 In the interest of space results are not reported in tables. 
17 
 
governance factors considered in turn as discussed in Section 4.2. Economic development is 
found to have a highly significant and negative effect, implying that firms in developing 
countries tend to issue less long-term debt, a result that contradicts the findings of Fan et al. 
(2004). In terms of legal and corporate governance variables, as predicted and in line with Fan et 
al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the corruption level is negatively 
associated with debt maturity, implying a positive relationship between legal enforcement and 
debt maturity, and supporting the monitoring function of short-term debt. Legal protection is 
also found to be a significant factor in determining firm’s debt maturity choice. In line with 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), firms in countries with superior creditor rights use 
relatively more short-term debt, implying that the ability of firms to use short-term debt is 
higher when creditors are better protected, as banks have more incentives to monitor borrowers. 
On the contrary, firms in countries with higher shareholder rights use more long-term debt since 
the agency cost of debt is lower and thus the need to use short-term loans to mitigate agency 
problems is reduced. Ownership concentration has a negative and significant relationship with 
debt maturity in support of the moral hazard hypothesis. Finally, a positive relationship is found 
between the market share of the big-5 auditors and debt maturity, highlighting the important 
role of auditors in facilitating the transmission of information.  
Since the estimates show that economic development and country dummies play a 
significant role in explaining debt maturity patterns, this is investigated further by the inclusion 
of market-wide variables. In particular, given that the sample countries are at different stages of 
economic development and were hit by the crisis by different degrees, some of the true market-
wide effects could have been averaged out if estimated over the full set of countries. It is an 
important question whether the identified market-wide determinants had a different impact on 
the sample countries depending upon their stage of development and vulnerability to the crisis. 
Equation (1) is augmented by market-wide factors for the pooled panels of the two country 
groupings, least and most affected by the crisis, as defined in Section 4.1, and is estimated by 
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using the GMM-SYS methodology. Further tests are conducted using pooled OLS and average 
cross-sectional framework to ensure the robustness of the results. The estimates based on GMM-
SYS are consistent with those from pooled OLS. However, the latter show higher significance 
levels, leading to stronger contrasting effects of market-wide factors. Therefore, Table 5 
presents the results of the pooled OLS estimations relating to firm-specific and market-wide 
determinants for the two country groupings identified.12  
[Insert Table 5] 
Estimates over the whole sample period show a negative and significant coefficient of 
bank development for the least affected countries, supporting the findings of Fan et al. (2004) 
that in developed economies banks are able to take full advantage of their monitoring power and 
act as information providers to other creditors. Thus, the larger the banking sector, the more 
firms are encouraged to issue short-term debt. On the contrary, in less developed countries a 
positive and significant relationship shows that a larger banking sector leads to more long-term 
debts. This is consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (1999) argument that in 
developing countries with weaker legal systems, a larger banking sector is associated with 
longer maturity debts, as creditor’s rights are strengthen by the size of the banking sector. In 
addition, the closer relationship between firms and their banks in developing countries and the 
lack of an efficient equity market may also encourage banks to grant relatively more long-term 
debts. 
The findings further reveal an opposite pattern in the relationships between stock market 
development and the term structure of interest rates and debt maturity between the two groups 
of countries. In the countries least affected by the crisis, where stock markets are relatively more 
developed and firms can more easily raise equity finance, firms are found to hold relatively 
                                                 
12
 The results based on the GMM-SYS estimation are not reported in tables. Previous studies have also found that 
the results may vary depending on the methodology applied. For example, Antoniou et al. (2006) find mixed effects 
of the term structure of interest rates on debt maturity, while Barclay and Smith (1995) find a negative and 
significant relationship when panel data are used in pooled OLS and fixed effects, but an insignificant relationship 
when cross-sectional data are used.  
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shorter maturity debt. The reverse is true for firms in the most affected countries, where stock 
markets are less developed. Consistent with the tax hypothesis, firms in countries most affected 
by the crisis employ more long-term debt when the term structure of interest rates has a positive 
slope. On the other hand, the market timing hypothesis dominates the effect in the least affected 
countries, in line with Guedes and Opler (1996). This latter finding shows some evidence of less 
than fully rational behaviour of managers (optimism) as discussed in Baker et al. (2007), namely 
that managers time their debt maturity choice by issuing short-term debt when the term spread is 
high, as they expect long-term rates to decline. Finally, consistent with the findings of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), high inflation is negatively related to the use of long-
term debt in the countries most affected by the crisis.  
In relation to the effects of the financial crisis, market-wide factors appears to be generally 
highly significant in both country groupings in the pre- and post-crisis periods, and the direction 
of the effects is in line with the findings for the whole sample period. Thus, overall the crisis did 
not alter the contrasting effects of market-wide determinants observed earlier.  However, it 
significantly changed the size of their impact, especially in the less developed countries. The 
coefficient of inflation is the only one that changes sign after the crisis and becomes positive for 
both country groupings. This may explain why inflation appeared insignificant in the previous 
aggregate analysis of the whole sample period. Over the pre-crisis period higher inflation 
appears to have been associated with reduced long-term debt to minimise the interest rate risk, 
consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999). 
In summary, the results confirm that market-wide variables are as important as firm-
specific characteristics in determining debt maturity structure. These market-wide determinants 
not only influence the maturity of firm’s borrowing, but they also appear to have different 
effects depending on the country’s economic development.  
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6.  Conclusions 
The paper investigates the effects of firm-specific as well as country-specific factors, such 
as economic conditions, corporate governance and institutional set-up, on the debt maturity 
structure of firms. It also provides the first evidence on the effects of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on the determinants of corporate debt maturity choice of firms operating in the region. 
Several conclusions emerge. Firstly, firms appear to have a target debt maturity structure. The 
speed of adjustment is substantially reduced during the post-crisis period in the countries least 
affected by the crisis, suggesting that the costs of moving towards the target increased with the 
crisis. Secondly, the debt maturity structure of sample firms is strongly related to a number of 
firm-specific and market-wide factors, as well as the country’s corporate governance, and the 
legal and institutional environments. These findings are consistent with a number of previous 
empirical studies, and offer further evidence for the Asia Pacific region. Thirdly, the evidence 
supports the view that the debt maturity structure decision can affect the cost of external finance 
and plays an important role in alleviating some capital market imperfections.  
Fourthly, the results show that the debt maturity structure decision can also help to 
alleviate the shortcomings of the legal and corporate governance systems. Market-wide factors 
further appear to influence debt maturity, and this effect depends on the country’s economic 
development. Fifthly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 appears to have had several significant 
effects on both firm-specific and market-wide determinants of debt maturity structure, especially 
in Thailand and Malaysia where the crisis originated. However, effects were observed even in 
the countries least affected by the crisis. More specifically, the relationship between debt 
maturity structure and many of its determinants changed significantly after the crisis, both in 
size and/or direction. Finally, the crisis forced managers to recognise the importance of an 
appropriate debt maturity structure for their firms, in terms of both reducing funding costs and 
liquidity constraints, and improving the information flow to outside investors and thus agency 
problems. 
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Table 1: Major indicators of economic condition, corporate governance and institutional environment in the sample countries. 
 
 Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia Source 
Economic Condition      
   Bank Development 5.0553 5.5927 8.0553 1.0101 Datastream 
   Stock Market Development 2.0826 5.1284 5.4856 0.8061 Datastream 
   Economic Development Developing Developing Developed Developed Fan et al. (2004) 
   Term Structure of Interest Rates 1.1212 1.3610 2.0260 1.6790 Datastream 
   Inflation 4.58 3.41 5.70 1.74 Datastream 
Rule of Law and Legal Protection     
   Corruption  6.95 4.9 0.87 1.45 Fan et al. (2004) 
   Creditor Rights 3 4 4 1 La Porta et al. (1998) 
   Shareholder Rights 2 4 4 4 La Porta et al. (1998) 
Ownership Concentration 0.47 0.54 0.49 0.28 La Porta et al. (1998) 
Big-5 Auditors’ Market Share 0.58 0.66 0.99 0.89 Fan et al. (2004) 
 
Table 2: Expected relation between debt maturity structure and firm-specific and country-specific determinants. 
  
Panel A: Firm-Specific Determinants 
Determinants Measurement Positive Negative Expected 
relation 
Leverage (LEV) Debt to total capital = Total debt 
/ (Total debt + MV of equity + 
BV of preference share) 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Moral hazard hypothesis Positive 
Firm Size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of assets Moral hazard hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Access to the market, 
Transaction cost 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Positive 
Growth Opportunity 
(GROW) 
(Total assets – Book value of 
equity + Market value of equity) 
/ Total assets 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Moral hazard hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Negative 
Earnings Volatility 
(VOL) 
Absolute value of {[(EBITt – 
EBITt-1)] /EBITt-1}- average of 
{[(EBITt – EBITt-1)]/EBITt-1} 
Liquidity risk hypothesis Moral hazard hypothesis 
Bankruptcy cost 
Negative 
Liquidity (LIQ) Current assets/ Current liabilities - Capacity Negative 
Profitability (PROF) Earnings before interest, tax and 
depreciation/ Total assets 
Tax hypothesis - Positive 
Share Price Performance 
(SPP) 
Changes in share prices Signalling hypothesis 
Market timing theory 
Optimistic behaviour Positive 
Asset Maturity (AMAT) Total fixed assets / Total assets Moral hazard hypothesis 
Liquidity, financial 
distress, cash flow 
Priority of claim Positive 
 
Panel B: Market-Wide Determinants 
Determinants Measurement Positive Negative Expected 
relation 
Economy Development 
(EDEV) 
Dummy equal to 1 for 
developing economy and 0 
otherwise  
- Maturity of the market Negative 
Bank Development 
(BKDEV) 
Bank assets / GDP Creditor rights Monitoring system Negative 
Stock Market 
Development (MKDEV) 
Market capitalization / GDP Information Other sources of finance Positive 
Term Structure of Interest 
Rates (TERM) 
Government bond yield – 
Treasury Bill (3 month rate) 
Tax hypothesis Market timing theory 
Optimistic behaviour 
Positive 
Inflation (INF) Changes in consumer price index - Uncertainty Negative 
 
Panel C: Legal and Governance Determinants 
Determinants Measurement Positive Negative Expected 
relation 
Quality of Legal 
Enforcement (CORR) 
Corruption level  
(See Fan et al., 2004) 
- Moral hazard hypothesis Negative 
Legal Protection (CRR 
and SHR) 
Creditor / Shareholder  rights  
 (See La Porta et al., 1998) 
- 
Moral hazard hypothesis 
Monitoring system 
- 
Negative 
Positive 
Ownership Concentration 
(OWN) 
Ownership by the 3 largest 
shareholders of 10 largest non-
financial domestic firms 
- Moral hazard hypothesis Negative 
The Presence of 
Information 
Intermediaries (AUD) 
The share of assets of listed 
companies audited by the big-
five auditors  
Moral hazard hypothesis - Positive 
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Table 3:  Averages of firm-specific and market-wide variables. 
 
Variable 
Panel A: Full Sample (1993 – 2001) Panel B: Countries least affected by the crisis Panel C: Countries most affected by the crisis 
(1) 
Countries 
least affected 
by the crisis 
(2) 
Countries 
most affected 
by the crisis 
(3) 
t-statistics 
(4) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1993 – 1996) 
(5) 
Post-Crisis 
(1998 – 2001) 
(6) 
t-statistics 
(7) 
Pre-Crisis 
(1993 – 1996) 
(8) 
Post-Crisis 
(1998 – 2001) 
(9) 
t-statistics 
 
            
MAT 0.5162 0.3000 27.7018 *** 0.4903 0.5290 -2.6283 *** 0.2801 0.3044 -2.7814 *** 
 
            
LEV 0.2146 0.3342 -22.8519 *** 0.1685 0.2478 -10.5588 *** 0.1930 0.4247 -34.1152 *** 
 
            
SIZE 12.1741 13.2509 -27.4032 *** 12.1175 12.2026 -1.1857  13.2692 13.2202 0.9552  
 
            
GROW -2.9056 1.7701 -9.2846 *** -4.3510 -2.3118 -1.7544  * 2.4793 1.2652 16.6497 *** 
 
            
VOL 3.4567 2.8833 1.6085  3.6560 3.2256 0.6078  2.7336 3.0501 -0.8973  
 
            
LIQ 2.3815 1.7119 7.5631 *** 2.4432 2.3598 0.4531  1.7495 1.6901 0.8461  
 
            
PROF 0.0789 0.0811 -0.3513  0.0713 0.0789 -0.4834  0.1274 0.0496 17.2047 *** 
 
            
SPP -0.0344 -0.1349 7.1901 *** 0.1201 -0.1101 10.8188 *** 0.0716 -0.1222 11.3368 *** 
 
            
AMAT 0.3431 0.3995 -11.6291 *** 0.3311 0.3502 -2.2973 ** 0.3897 0.4068 -2.6642 *** 
 
            
BKDEV 5.3197 5.4288 -2.1736 ** 4.7229 5.9479 -11.7609 *** 4.7038 5.9828 -128.7655 *** 
 
            
MKDEV 3.6686 4.1985 -13.2042 *** 3.7920 3.6902 1.3760  5.3815 3.1652 61.8787 *** 
 
            
TERM 1.8709 1.2936 20.7895 *** 2.1338 1.6628 16.6944 *** 0.9997 2.4561 55.1499 *** 
 
            
INF 4.4598 3.3465 9.2681 *** 7.7899 2.0238 23.1601 *** 4.0405 2.4312 47.7391 *** 
 
Debt maturity (MAT) is the proportion of long-term debt to total debt. Leverage (LEV) is the debt to capital ratio. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Growth 
opportunity (GROW) is the ratio of book value of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to book value of total assets. Earnings volatility (VOL) is the absolute 
difference between annual percentage change in earnings before interest and taxes and the average of this change. Liquidity (LIQ) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Profitability (PROF) is the ratios of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation to total assets. Share price performance (SPP) is the first difference of logs of annual share price. Asset 
Maturity (AMAT) is the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. Bank development (BKDEV) is the ratio of bank assets to GDP. Stock market development (MKDEV) is the ratio of 
market capitalization to GDP. Term structure of interest rates (TERM) is the differences between government bond yield and Treasury bill (3 month rate). Inflation (INF) is changes in 
consumer price index.   
The t-statistics reported in Column (3) are the comparisons of the differences in average values between countries least and most affected by the crisis over the full sample while the ones 
in Columns (6) and (9) are the comparisons across pre- and post-crisis periods for each country grouping.  
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Dynamic debt maturity structure : System GMM estimation 
 
Variable Panel A: By country: 1993 - 2001 Panel B: By country groupings: Pre- and Post-Crisis 
 Thailand Malaysia Singapore Australia Countries most affected by the crisis Countries least affected by the crisis 
     Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Wald Test Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Wald Test 
Constant -0.6005** -0.6105*** -0.8560** -0.2231 -0.2612 -0.0646  -0.7642 -0.8152  
t-statistics (-2.1900) (-3.2700) (-2.5500) (-0.8110) (-0.3490) (-0.3390)  (-1.4000) (-1.6000)  
MATt-1 0.4458*** 0.5178*** 0.3737*** 0.2942*** 0.5919*** 0.5583***  0.2811* 0.4630***  
t-statistics (6.9300) (9.2100) (5.5700) (3.5000) (3.0000) (7.5700) <0.2079> (1.8000) (3.8600) <2.3021>** 
LEV 0.2435*** 0.0849 0.2478*** 0.2749* 0.0809 0.1200*  0.6950** -0.1155  
t-statistics (4.2400) (1.6200) (2.7200) (1.9200) (0.5430) (1.6600) <2.7627>*** (1.9700) (-1.3800) <94.1953>*** 
SIZE 0.0401** 0.0507*** 0.0735*** 0.0385* 0.0423 -0.0004  0.0891* 0.0869**  
t-statistics (2.1400) (4.3700) (2.7900) (1.7400) (0.9250) (-0.0265) <0.0007> (1.8000) (2.0100) <0.0027> 
GROW 0.0184 0.0117 -0.0072 -0.0001 -0.0072 0.0009  -0.0070 0.0004  
t-statistics (0.8380) (1.2800) (-0.2700) (-0.0643) (-0.2970) (0.0688) <0.0047> (-1.2800) (0.2010) <0.0402> 
VOL 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0008** -0.0003 0.0008 0.0004  -0.0009 -0.0008**  
t-statistics (0.2920) (1.0200) (-2.5200) (-0.7090) (1.0300) (0.3100) <0.0959> (-0.4720) (-2.5600) <6.5488>*** 
LIQ 0.0638*** 0.0554*** 0.0669** 0.0211*** 0.0173 0.0670***  0.0120 0.0508***  
t-statistics (3.9900) (3.3300) (2.4600) (3.6900) (0.7990) (3.3900) <11.5020>*** (0.7860) (3.1700) <10.0256>*** 
PROF 0.1088* 0.0840** 0.2663 -0.0614 -0.0383 0.0679**  -0.1615 0.0386  
t-statistics (1.9300) (1.9800) (1.4500 (-0.5420) (-0.1120) (2.2700) <5.1358>*** (-0.3750) (0.3800) <0.1443> 
SPP -0.0432*** -0.0044 -0.0117 0.0545*** 0.0260 -0.0038  0.0373 0.0213  
t-statistics (-4.1400) (-0.5710) (-0.6960) (2.6200) (0.4900) (-0.3300) <0.1086> (0.5780) (0.9300) <0.8640> 
AMAT -0.1407 0.1640* 0.1682 0.1169 -0.4120 0.0906  -0.2954 0.0037  
t-statistics (-1.1300) (1.6700) (1.1300) (0.9600) (-1.5400) (0.7840) <0.6152> (-1.1700) (0.0194) <0.0004> 
 
          
AR(1) -6.038*** -6.544*** -4.797*** -0.306 -0.706 -7.326***  -1.478 -4.588***  
AR(2) 0.734 0.825 0.306 1.100 - -  - -  
Wald test1(df) 159.70 (9)*** 223.10 (9)*** 166.00 (9)*** 51.85 (9)*** 24.15 (9)*** 97.93 (9)***  52.74 (9)*** 99.07 (9)***  
Wald test2(df) 22.36 (7)*** 34.25 (8)*** 16.14 (7)** 12.77 (8) 1.26 (3) 2.38 (3)  4.13 (3) 7.33 (3)*  
Wald test3(df) 12.39 (6)* 7.63 (7) 7.61 (6) 11.17 (7) 0.43 (2) 1.94 (2)  2.43 (2) 5.01 (2)*  
Sargan test(df) 108.20 (107) 143.70 (134) 98.53 (116) 106.30 (125) 24.81 (44) 50.73 (35)**  44.87 (44) 40.83 (35)  
Obs 1412 1807 889 597 373 1758  301 760  
Firms 255 423 178 129 182 623  128 273  
 
 
 
 
See Table 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the variables. Firms with less than three year consecutive observations are excluded. The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. Six test statistics are reported. AR(1) and AR(2) are first and second order autocorrelation of residual, respectively, which are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation. Wald Test 1 tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients, asymmptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null hypothesis of no relationship. Wald test 2 and 3 test the joint 
significance of time and dummies. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying restrictions, asymptotically as χ2(df) under null hypothesis of instruments' validity. Wald test in Panel B are estimated to test for 
any statistically significant change in the role of the identified variables because of the financial crisis. Time dummies are included in all models. 
*, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Pooled time series and cross sectional analysis of the firm-specific and market-wide determinants by country groupings. 
 
Variable Panel A: Countries most affected by the crisis 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Constant -1.0012*** -1.2801*** -1.2132*** -0.8071*** -0.5892*** -0.7396*** -0.3210*** -0.2976** -0.3283*** -0.2833*** -0.2912** -0.6368*** 
t-statistics (-5.7400) (-3.6600) (-6.3000) (-5.3500) (-3.2000) (-6.6000) (-3.0000) (-2.1400) (-4.2100) (-2.6300) (-2.0000) (-5.9800) 
LEV 0.1227*** 0.1587** 0.1280*** 0.1600*** 0.1798*** 0.1536*** 0.1028*** 0.0845 0.1154*** 0.1050*** 0.1616*** 0.1228*** 
t-statistics (3.9700) (2.4900) (3.8100) (5.0900) (2.7900) (4.5100) (3.3100) (1.3600) (3.4900) (3.3900) (2.6000) (3.7300) 
Wald Test   <0.8303>   <0.5902>   <12.2122>***   <1.3944> 
SIZE 0.0439*** 0.0409*** 0.0475*** 0.0508*** 0.0427*** 0.0557*** 0.0360*** 0.0361*** 0.0415*** 0.0366*** 0.0430*** 0.0423*** 
t-statistics (7.5800) (4.3600) (8.1100) (7.5300) (4.3500) (8.3300) (7.2400) (4.2900) (7.6800) (7.2900) (4.4100) (7.7300) 
Wald Test   <1.2940>   <3.8049>*   <0.9894>   <0.0130> 
GROW 0.0051 0.0024 0.0039 0.0026 0.0025 0.0038 0.0036 0.0012 0.0036 0.0028 0.0021 0.0043 
t-statistics (1.5100) (0.5870) (0.5250) (0.7710) (0.6080) (0.4980) (1.0500) (0.2810) (0.4860) (0.8100) (0.4930) (0.5630) 
Wald Test   <0.2761>   <0.2476>   <0.2363>   <0.3171> 
VOL -0.0015** -0.0011 -0.0015** -0.0015*** -0.0011 -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0011 -0.0016** -0.0016*** -0.0009 -0.0015** 
t-statistics (-2.5300) (-1.1800) (-2.2200) (-2.6700) (-1.1100) (-2.1900) (-2.5700) (-1.1700) (-2.3600) (-2.6400) (-0.9460) (-2.1200) 
Wald Test   <4.9094>**   <4.7753>**   <5.5913>**   <4.5061>** 
LIQ 0.0269*** 0.0202* 0.0266*** 0.0291*** 0.0212* 0.0281*** 0.0253*** 0.0172 0.0252*** 0.0256*** 0.0203* 0.0253*** 
t-statistics (3.7700) (1.6500) (3.4100) (3.9600) (1.7300) (3.4800) (3.7200) (1.4200) (3.4600) (3.7500) (1.7000) (3.5300) 
Wald Test   <0.6800>   <0.7321>   <11.9998>***   <0.4903> 
PROF 0.0976*** -0.2091 0.1058*** 0.1147*** -0.1759 0.1214*** 0.0843*** -0.2935** 0.0966*** 0.0816*** -0.2032 0.1089*** 
t-statistics (4.7600) (-1.5000) (4.5800) (5.4400) (-1.2500) (5.0300) (4.0700) (-2.0500) (4.2500) (3.9200) (-1.4500) (4.6700) 
Wald Test   <21.0119>***   <25.2658>***   <294.1330>***   <21.8234>*** 
SPP 0.0088* 0.0363* 0.0015 -0.0142** 0.0242 -0.0097 0.0044 0.0754*** 0.0066 0.0031 0.0489*** 0.0047 
t-statistics (1.8300) (1.9500) (0.2270) (-2.5000) (1.2700) (-1.3800) (0.9020) (3.9400) (0.9380) (0.6350) (2.7900) (0.6880) 
Wald Test   <27.7734>***   <1.8983>   <94.9972>***   <42.4214>*** 
AMAT 0.1657*** 0.2132*** 0.1570*** 0.1852*** 0.2193*** 0.1730*** 0.1477*** 0.1972*** 0.1443*** 0.1497*** 0.2163*** 0.1461*** 
t-statistics (4.4600) (3.5100) (4.0900) (5.0600) (3.6100) (4.5600) (3.9300) (3.2600) (3.7400) (4.0000) (3.6000) (3.7900) 
Wald Test   <2.1527>   <1.4885>   <1.8773>   <3.3056>* 
BKDEV 0.1206*** 0.1925*** 0.1181***          
t-statistics (5.6500) (3.2300) (5.3800)          
Wald Test   <11.5138>***          
MKDEV    0.0429*** 0.0281*** 0.0511***       
t-statistics    (7.0800) (3.3700) (6.9300)       
Wald Test      <9.7510>***       
TERM       0.0043** -0.0427*** -0.0240***    
t-statistics       (2.1700) (-2.9000) (-3.7200)    
Wald Test         <8.4191>***    
INF          -0.0121*** -0.0357*** 0.0492*** 
t-statistics          (-3.3100) (-4.1900) (5.2800) 
Wald Test            <82.8497>*** 
R2 0.1432 0.1494 0.1590 0.1620 0.1526 0.1765 0.1309 0.1440 0.1490 0.1324 0.1561 0.1551 
Adj2 0.1381 0.1318 0.1527 0.1571 0.1351 0.1703 0.1258 0.1263 0.1425 0.1273 0.1387 0.1487 
No. of Obs. 4794 1138 3063 4794 1138 3063 4794 1138 3063 4794 1138 3063 
 
 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Industry and time dummies were included in the model in order to control for industry and time effects but no statistically significant 
effect was found. See Table 1 and 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the variables.  *, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Pooled time series and cross sectional analysis of the firm-specific and market-wide determinants by country groupings (continued). 
 
Variable Panel B: Countries least affected by the crisis 
 Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
 Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Full Sample Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Constant -0.2157** -0.3640** -0.1097 -0.2358** -0.3795*** -0.1382 -0.1745 -0.5006*** -0.1235 -0.4022*** -0.4791*** -0.3982*** 
t-statistics (-2.0800) (-2.4800) (-0.9310) (-2.2700) (-2.6100) (-1.1800) (-1.5200) (-3.2400) (-1.0300) (-3.5200) (-3.1900) (-3.4000) 
LEV 0.2868*** 0.5145*** 0.2127*** 0.2655*** 0.5108*** 0.2027*** 0.2379*** 0.5348*** 0.1773*** 0.1823*** 0.5235*** 0.0954 
t-statistics (5.6300) (5.0000) (3.6100) (5.2000) (4.9600) (3.4500) (4.4400) (5.0900) (3.0100) (3.3100) (5.0200) (1.5700) 
Wald Test   <26.1745>***   <27.4486>***   <36.7579>***   <49.8199>*** 
SIZE 0.0523*** 0.0635*** 0.0518*** 0.0541*** 0.0639*** 0.0522*** 0.0585*** 0.0670*** 0.0566*** 0.0639*** 0.0669*** 0.0615*** 
t-statistics (7.6500) (6.0100) (6.3700) (7.9400) (6.0800) (6.4300) (7.7700) (5.8700) (6.9700) (8.2700) (5.9800) (7.4200) 
Wald Test   <2.0682>   <2.0700>   <1.6352>   <0.4176> 
GROW -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0018 
t-statistics (-0.4980) (-0.7780) (-0.3460) (-0.5700) (-0.7760) (-0.3450) (-1.2300) (-1.0700) (-0.7920) (-1.3800) (-0.9960) (-1.1100) 
Wald Test   <0.1197>   <0.1192>   <0.6275>   <1.2213> 
VOL -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0014** -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0013** -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0017*** -0.0007 0.0008 -0.0017*** 
t-statistics (-0.8640) (1.4500) (-2.2900) (-0.8140) (1.4300) (-2.2500) (-1.0500) (0.8340) (-2.8900) (-1.0300) (0.9890) (-2.7000) 
Wald Test   <5.2337>**   <5.0708>**   <8.3549>***   <7.2878>*** 
LIQ 0.0199*** 0.0110 0.0289*** 0.0198*** 0.011 0.0292*** 0.0208*** 0.0121 0.0303*** 0.0205*** 0.0119 0.0275*** 
t-statistics (2.8400) (1.3700) (4.4200) (2.8000) (1.3800) (4.5100) (2.8700) (1.4700) (4.7800) (2.8300) (1.4700) (4.1000) 
Wald Test   <19.5215>***   <20.3160>***   <22.8249>***   <16.7801>*** 
PROF -0.0491 -0.0555 -0.0529 -0.0502 -0.0548 -0.0620 -0.0424 -0.0537 -0.0371 -0.0313 -0.0511 0.0059 
t-statistics (-1.6000) (-1.2200) (-0.7840) (-1.6200) (-1.2100) (-0.9230) (-1.1400) (-1.0700) (-0.5220) (-0.8860) (-1.0800) (0.0777) 
Wald Test   <0.6147>   <0.8520>   <0.2722>   <0.0060> 
SPP 0.0261** 0.0387 0.0131 0.0386*** 0.0457 0.0275** 0.0499*** 0.0540 0.0363** 0.0431*** 0.0488 0.0070 
t-statistics (2.4800) (1.1700) (1.0200) (3.5700) (1.3700) (2.0600) (4.2600) (1.5800) (2.5400) (3.7300) (1.4600) (0.4960) 
Wald Test   <1.0359>   <4.2288>**   <6.4459>**   <0.2462> 
AMAT 0.1912*** 0.0792 0.2395*** 0.1878*** 0.0804 0.2379*** 0.1663*** 0.0940 0.2122*** 0.1615*** 0.0874 0.2058*** 
t-statistics (3.9000) (0.9700) (4.1700) (3.8300) (0.9810) (4.1400) (3.1100) (1.0600) (3.5800) (2.9400) (1.0000) (3.4300) 
Wald Test   <17.4244>***   <17.1412>***   <12.7825>***   <11.7431>*** 
BKDEV -0.0337*** -0.0352*** -0.0332***          
t-statistics (-10.5000) (-5.9900) (-9.3300)          
Wald Test   <0.2998>          
MKDEV    -0.0508*** -0.0410*** -0.0550***       
t-statistics    (-10.1000) (-5.6300) (-9.2500)       
Wald Test      <5.5115>**       
TERM       -0.0776*** -0.0007 -0.1177***    
t-statistics       (-6.3300) (-0.0404) (-7.7900)    
Wald Test         <60.6197>***    
INF          -0.0011 -0.0033** 0.0493*** 
t-statistics          (-0.7160) (-2.2900) (6.2800) 
Wald Test            <44.8931>*** 
R2 0.3180 0.3393 0.3238 0.3100 0.3337 0.3182 0.2538 0.2784 0.2839 0.2306 0.2842 0.2532 
Adj2 0.3089 0.3115 0.3119 0.3008 0.3057 0.3062 0.2439 0.2481 0.2713 0.2204 0.2540 0.2401 
No. of Obs. 2129 570 1328 2129 570 1328 2129 570 1328 2129 570 1328 
 
 
 
The t-statistics are the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Industry and time dummies were included in the model in order to control for industry and time effects but no statistically significant 
effect was found. See Table 1 and 3 and Section 3 for the definition of the variables.  *, **, ***    Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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